With the decision to stop building capital ship immediately before the beginning of the Pacific War, the development of a new type of fire control system suffered the same fate. Fundamental revisions of the applied systems were considered unnecessary in view of the belief of individual superiority, which would decide the outcome of the multi-phased decisive fleet battle.
After the loss of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima in the Third Solomon Seabattle (12–15 October 1942) it was rumoured that the enemy used a new system capable of “seeing at night” and the loss of the destroyers Murasame and Minegumo in the night battle in the Kula Gulf (6 March 1943) transformed this supposition into certainty – the USN applied radar-controlled firing; the IJN had also lost this superiority despite its extensive pre-war night battle training.
Basing upon studies of the Navy Gunnery School in 1943 #22 radar was reconstructed for fire control and mounted on the capital ships in 1944, partly under very unfavourable conditions. The properties were no match for the advanced systems of the Allied forces, which utilised radar-controlled firing since 1942. Teaching about radar for range measurement and fire control (densoku shageki) was only taken up in the curriculum of the Navy Gunnery School at Yokosuka in February 1945.
Aircraft had already proven itself to be a true enemy of capital ships in the European War and this experience was repeated at the beginning of the Pacific War. The lack of effective AA weapons even required the use of the main guns of the capital ships. The introduction of the particularly designed Type 3 incendiary shrapnel shell (shōsandan), besides of the use of the Type 0 common shell, required the addition of components to the low-angle fire control system of the battleships – solely designed for ship vs. ship gun battles – to enable AA firing. However, it was only an emergency measure of limited value and the destruction of the remaining capital ships in naval ports by carrier-based aircraft, suffering very small losses, in March and July 1945 proved the inability of defense against air attacks and repeated the examples of Musashi and Yamato from October 1944 and April 1945, respectively.
The limited value of an emergency measure in combination with other defects was also shown in the first practical application of radar for fire control by the Kurita force in the Battle of Samar (one of the four sequences of the Battle for Leyte Gulf) on 25 October 1944. The fight against the escort aircraft carriers (CVEs), running away evasively, defended by their own aircraft and escort ships (destroyers and destroyer escorts) and covered by smoke screens and squalls, ended with a disappointing result. Of course, tactical blunder was one cause, but the hitting rate was very small (about 2.8%) despite “excellently grouped salvos” and may be considered almost unavoidable in view of the considerable technical backwardness and lack of practical training.
 In the Japanese sources no hint could be found indicating the design of a new system or components. This also appears unlikely in view of the just developed and produced Type 98 fire control system for the battleships of the Yamato class.
 Technicians had to advance to Tawi Tawi to install the equipment and give instructions. Applied research and firing practice of the fleet were almost non-existent and the real practical value of radar-controlled firing was sometimes doubted. Time was lacking for the training of operators and radar officers and everything had an emergency and tentative character.
 The US Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Report O-31 “Japanese Surface and General Fire Control”, p. 1. However, this feature was not caused by the radar-controlled firing but was the result of the Type 98 firing time retarding device (98 shiki happō chien sōchi), for minimising dispersion (viz. enclosure).
 Firing over smoke screens on ships hiding behind it had been experimented by the Navy Gunnery School in 1931. Two years later experimental firing with the main guns of the capital ships over smoke screens was executed but it was seldom trained after that and may have been almost forgotten by the “Hashirajima fleet”.